W12 - Viewing the Distributed Ideology from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Combining a recent book I read, OODA Work Method, with the Russia–Ukraine conflict, I want to discuss the distributed mindset.

First, about OODA Work Method: I was drawn to the book by a line on the cover, “Use PDCA for continuous improvement in stability; use OODA for rapid response in change.” A Japanese author wrote this for contemporary Japanese companies, criticizing their rigid, single-minded perfectionism and explaining Michael Porter’s observation that “Japanese firms lack strategy.” Most importantly, the book presents a consulting framework based on OODA.

The problem with PDCA is: where does the P come from? For situations with past experience and well‑defined processes, drafting an iterative Plan is fine. But today’s world is full of black swans and unexpected changes; environments shift in ways you can’t anticipate, and there isn’t time to craft elaborate plans.

The four letters of OODA stand for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. “Observe” and “Orient” align your cognition with users and facts to grasp a worldview. On the basis of an accurate worldview and product perspective, you form hypotheses and run tests, then start a new loop. This closely resembles lean startup: the book even states that lean startup originates from OODA. The essence of the book is introducing OODA into a company to derive personnel and management systems, emphasizing shared VSA and goal setting to ultimately achieve a disciplined, decentralized—or autonomous-thinking—organization. Only toward the end did I realize the narrative was actually pointing toward DAO.

The OODA loop was originally developed by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd as a strategic theory applicable to all domains. After the U.S. military widely adopted the OODA loop, its combat doctrine shifted from a “war of attrition” aimed at inflicting heavy losses on the enemy to a “maneuver warfare” aimed at depriving the enemy commander (decision maker) of the will to fight.

Coincidentally, in recent analyses of the Russia–Ukraine situation I read, this military theory has become a consensus among modern armed forces. Militaries of major powers are reorganizing toward a “light, fast, agile” model—for example, both China and the U.S. are developing combined arms brigade structures. In the Russia–Ukraine standoff we often see operational units Russia deploys called BTGs.

Put simply, a BTG is a brigade with about half its troops pulled out and filled with signals intelligence, fire support, and air defense units. Most commonly it centers on one mechanized infantry battalion, supported by one artillery battalion, one rocket artillery company, one tank company, one reconnaissance and support company, two air defense companies, plus logistics and communications units.

BTG is a result of reforms by the current defense minister, Shoigu. Due to Russia’s limited finances, the BTG is effectively a scaled‑down equivalent of a combined arms battalion. Russia’s old Soviet system emphasized mass and high-intensity engagement, prepared to fight great powers, but it led to bloated formations, very inefficient communication, and excessive personnel on the payroll, unable to get effective intelligence from satellite networks. After these reforms, Russia’s operational aim shifted from “large-scale total war” to “contesting middle-power adversaries of a certain scale.”

Finally, the Russia–Ukraine conflict has accelerated the development of a new technological form: Web3. Kicking Russia out of SWIFT was arguably the most damaging Western sanction, and it prompted sovereign states to worry about centralized financial mechanisms; Web3 is clearly an ideal technical response. The conflict has shown novel forms of warfare—NFT fundraising, cryptocurrency sanctions, Ukrainian DAOs, and so on. At the same time, domestic companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance have recently been engaging frequently with foreign NFT firms, signaling intentions to position themselves in Web3.