W12 - Viewing Distributed Thought from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Combining a recent book I read, OODA Workflow, with the Russia–Ukraine conflict, let’s talk about decentralized thinking.

First about OODA Workflow: I was drawn by a line on the book’s cover, “Use PDCA for steady optimization, use OODA for rapid response in change.” The book is written by a Japanese author for contemporary Japanese companies; he criticizes the rigid, monolithic perfectionism of Japanese firms and explains Michael Porter’s observation that “Japanese companies lack strategy.” Most importantly, the book presents a consulting framework based on OODA.

The problem with PDCA is: where does P come from? For situations with past experience and well-defined procedures, creating an iterative Plan is fine. But today’s world is full of black swans — unpredictable environmental changes and unexpected events — and there isn’t time to craft detailed plans.

OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. “Observe” and “Orient” align one’s own understanding with users and facts to grasp a worldview. Based on an accurate grasp of worldview and product perspective, form hypotheses and tests, then start the next cycle. This is very similar to lean startup; the book even states that lean startup derives from OODA. The core of the book is introducing OODA into companies and deriving personnel and management systems that emphasize shared VSA and goal setting to achieve a disciplined decentralized — or autonomous-thinking — organization. Toward the end I realized the narrative actually points toward a DAO.

The OODA loop was originally developed by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd as a strategic theory applicable across domains. After the U.S. military fully adopted the OODA-based strategy, its operational posture shifted from a “war of attrition” aimed at inflicting heavy losses on the enemy to a “maneuver warfare” aimed at breaking the enemy commander’s will to fight.

Coincidentally, in recent analyses of the Russia–Ukraine situation I’ve read, this military strategic theory has become a consensus in modern militaries. Armed forces of major powers are moving toward lighter, faster, more agile structures, such as the combined-arms brigade concepts pursued by China and the U.S. In the Russia–Ukraine standoff we often see Russian deployed combat units called BTGs.

A BTG, simply put, is a brigade with half its strength pulled out and refilled with electronic reconnaissance, fire-support, and air-defense units. It is usually centered on a single mechanized infantry battalion and paired with a field artillery battalion, a rocket artillery company, a tank company, a reconnaissance and support company, two air-defense companies, plus logistics and communications units.

BTG is a product of reforms by current Defense Minister Shoigu. Because Russia’s finances are limited, the BTG functions as a scaled-down combined-arms brigade. Under the old Soviet system Russia maintained large, high-readiness formations prepared to confront great powers, but that led to bloated structures, very inefficient communications, excessive ghost personnel, and an inability to provide effective intelligence even via satellite networks. After these reforms, Russia’s operational aim shifted from “large-scale total war” to “confronting medium-strength states of certain scale.”

Finally, the Russia–Ukraine conflict accelerated the development of a new technological form: Web3. The most damaging Western sanction was cutting Russia off from SWIFT, which triggered concern among sovereign states about centralized mechanisms, and Web3 is an obvious technical answer. The conflict has shown novel forms of warfare, such as NFT fundraising, cryptocurrency sanctions, and Ukraine DAOs. At the same time, some domestic companies — for example Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance — have recently been in frequent contact with foreign NFT firms, indicating deliberate Web3 outreach.