W22 - Notes: Points Card & Pico

I recently activated the Fenfen Card on JD.com; its predecessor was Baitiao Flash Pay. It feels like they've taken the second-tier account concept to the extreme. Both Baitiao Flash Pay and its upgraded Fenfen Card are built on second-tier accounts linked to JD Baitiao, a credit asset, apparently aiming to let Baitiao expand beyond JD’s own payment ecosystem. The difference is that Fenfen Card has greatly expanded its usage scenarios.

The Fenfen Card I activated is a Shanghai Bank second-tier account that, once linked to WeChat, can be used online instantly. Beyond consumer payments, it supports WeChat transfers, sending red envelopes, topping up WeChat balance, and even buying funds directly through WeChat’s wealth management. Keep in mind that Fenfen Card is backed by Baitiao, which tempts one with the idea of getting something for nothing. Before attempting anything, I checked the Fenfen Card’s bill in Baitiao: even without installments it accrues daily interest, so my expectations were misplaced. From my experience, I’m surprised by how bold and imaginative Fenfen Card’s innovations are. By leveraging the payment capability of a second-tier account and extending into external ecosystem scenarios, it maximizes the profit potential of its own asset.

We can also view this model as a form of managed accounts. If we abstract a managed-account model into three elements—user, channel, and asset—then a business card represents co-managed users, with the channel and asset external. Fenfen Card represents co-managed users and assets, both internal, while the channel remains external. Compared with the business card, Fenfen Card manages more and heavier responsibilities—and naturally entails greater regulatory risk.

A while ago I picked up a Pico Neo3 for under 2,000 yuan, primarily because of the price. I bought a Neo2 two years earlier for about 5,000 yuan. Since then Pico has changed course under new ownership, and its approach is markedly different from before.

In my experience, the biggest changes in the Neo3 are on the software side: the new owner clearly favors an internet-style strategy. They added a proprietary browser, strengthened the app store, and built an official content distribution platform, firmly controlling the distribution (and cash) gateway to the future. Current content is still mainly games and video, and production succeeds on entertainment value—VR’s perspective consistently delivers a fresh experience. In terms of addictiveness and polish it’s similar to the previous generation. But regardless of how rough some VR products are now, I can sense tremendous upside in virtual experiences. In VR hardware I feel every industry could be rethought—retail, advertising, content, social, education, OTA, OA, and so on. What’s lacking now are users and capital. Following the smartphone trajectory, if Neo drops below a thousand yuan it could trigger a major breakout—and that moment seems increasingly close. Maybe it’s time to look for a “VR development from beginner to expert” course—do frontend engineers still have the energy to learn it?